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CHENAULT V. HUIE1:  DENYING THE EXISTENCE OF A LEGAL DUTY BETWEEN A MOTHER 
AND HER UNBORN CHILD 
 
“The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those who by their 
wrongful act, if such be proved, have invaded the right of an individual.”2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When an unborn child is injured by its mother, and subsequently born 
alive, who should be protected?  The Court of Appeals of Texas, in Chenault v. 
Huie,3 feared the slippery slope,4 and gave deference to the mother when it 
denied the existence of a legal duty between mother and fetus.5  Few cases6 
have directly addressed a child’s tort action against her mother for prenatal 
substance abuse that resulted in injuries sustained while en ventre sa mere.7 
 
This Note discusses the general background of a child’s right to sue for 
fetal injury and the liability of the individuals that cause the fetal harm.  
Specifically, this Note focuses on the fallacy of the Texas court’s8 refusal to 
establish a legal duty arising from the relationship of a mother to her unborn 
child.  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
Like the fetus who develops within her mother’s womb until she reaches 
                                                 
1 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ). 
2 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946) (quoting Justice McGuire).  “And what 
right is more inherent, and more sacrosanct, than that of the individual in his possession and 
enjoyment of his life, his limbs and his body?”  Id.  (completing Justice McGuire’s thoughts). 
3 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ). 
4 Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d at 478.  “[T]he recognition of a general legal duty of care owed 
by a pregnant woman to her fetus, which is a necessary prerequisite to imposing any tort 
liability on Huie, has far broader implications than simply holding drug-abusing mothers 
civilly liable to their later born children.”  Id. 
5 Id.  “We conclude, therefore, that current law in Texas relating to negligent and grossly 
negligent conduct does not impose or encompass a general legal duty owed by a mother to 
her fetus.”  Id. 
6 See discussion infra Part IV.  See also  State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).  Gray, the 
mother, was indicted for child endangerment since she had given birth to a cocaine-addicted 
baby.  Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court denied the existence of the parent-child relationship since 
Gray “did not become a parent until the birth of the child.”  Id. at 710-11.  See generally 
Deborah Ann Bailey, Comment, Maternal Substance Abuse:  Does Ohio Have an Answer?  
17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1019 (1992) (discussing the magnitude of the maternal substance abuse 
problem, as well as detailing maternal use of cocaine and the effects of that usage).  
7 “In its mother’s womb.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (6th ed. 1990). 
8 Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ). 
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maturity, the law concerning prenatal torts is also developing but has not yet 
matured.  Chenault9 is the most recent case10 to consider whether a child may 
sustain a cause of action against a mother for prenatal injury.11  To put this 
case in perspective, the following areas of law are discussed in relation to the 
elements within Chenault12:  The Fetus as a Person; Parental Immunity; Third-
Party Liability for Fetal Injury; Criminal Punishment for Fetal Abuse; and Public 
Policy.   
 
A.  The Fetus as a Person 
 
Three different theories have evolved surrounding a child’s right to sue 
based on a prenatal injury:  Entity Theory,13 Viability Theory,14 and Biological 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Chenault was decided on April 15, 1999. 
11 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 474.  “In this case of first impression, we address the question of 
whether a woman may be held civilly liable for conduct engaged in while pregnant that causes 
injury to her later born child.”  Id. 
12 Id. 
13 “[T]he unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury.”  Dietrich v. 
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884).  See also  Ron Beal, “Can I Sue Mommy?”  An Analysis 
of a Woman’s Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 325, 327-31 (1984).  Beal addresses the importance of the mother’s body to pregnancy 
and its importance to the judiciary: 
[T]he issue that will confront the courts is to determine when, once the 
medical community can find the causal relationship between the injuries of 
the child and the acts of a woman after conception and during prenatal 
development, a woman’s responsibility should extend to such a result as a 
matter of public policy. 
The crux of this decision will be whether the courts will hold as a 
matter of public policy that a woman should be held to a standard of 
conduct toward her own body long before the actual duty arises due to 
her continuing ability to conceive.  Because of the fictional relationship 
that will be imposed between a woman and a “being” inside of her own 
body, the problem of knowledge of the existence of that being will be 
paramount.   
Id. at 364 (emphasis in original). 
14 A viable child is “one capable of living outside of the womb.”  Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 
138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946).  The Bonbrest court further states that a human being “has, if viable, 
its own bodily form and members, manifests all of the anatomical  characteristics of 
individuality, possesses its own circulatory, vascular and excretory systems and is capable 
now of being ushered into the visible world.”  Id. at 141.  See also  Judith Kahn, Note, Of 
Woman’s First Disobedience:  Forsaking a Duty of Care to her Fetus--Is this a Mother’s 
Crime?, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 810-15 (1987) (discussing the legal status of the fetus).  Kahn 
further describes the dilemma facing the judiciary:  “[t]oday, scientific advancements indicate 
that using viability as the sole determinant of the potentiality of human life is medically 
2
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Theory.15  Entwined within these theories is the “born alive” doctrine.16   
 
1.  Entity Theory 
 
The first case to consider whether a child could sustain an action for 
prenatal injury occurred in 1884,17 and was argued before the esteemed 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.18  The case involved a pregnant woman who 
miscarried after falling on a defect in the highway.19  Since the injury occurred 
to the mother, Holmes found no cause of action allowable from the fetus.20  
                                                                                                                         
unsound.  Doctors and medical experts agree that viability is an indeterminate, fluid and 
shifting concept.”  Id. at 812. 
15 See James Andrew Freeman, Comment, Prenatal Substance Abuse:  Texas, Texans and 
Future Texans Can’t Afford It , 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 539, 564-66 (1996) (discussing the 
development of fetal rights under the common law).  Freeman reconciled the three theories:  
“[T]he ‘biological theory’ which made no distinction between viability and nonviability, but 
instead triggered liability if the fetus was born alive regardless of when the fetal injury 
occurred.”  Id. at 564. 
16 See id. at 567.  (“[T]he first prerequisite to fetal rights is the necessity for the child to be 
born alive.”). See also  Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).  The long history of the 
born-alive doctrine is evidenced by Holmes’ opinion, in which he states, “Lord Coke’s rule 
requires that the woman be quick with child, which, as this court has decided, means more 
than pregnant, and requires that the child shall have reached some degree of quasi 
independent life at the moment of the act.”  Id. at 16.  See also  Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994).  The Hughes court chastises the history of the doctrine by stating: 
[T]he antiquity of a rule is no measure of its soundness.  “It is 
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was 
laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and 
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past” . . . Medical 
science now . . . provide[s] competent proof as to whether the fetus 
was alive at the time of a defendant’s conduct and whether [her] 
conduct was the cause of [the injury] . . . .   
Id. at 733. 
17 Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). 
18 Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935) served on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
from 1882-1902, and he wrote nearly one thousand opinions before President Theodore 
Roosevelt appointed Holmes to the United States Supreme Court.  Sheldon M. Novick, 
Introduction to  the Dover Edition of OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW iii, xx-xxi  
(General Publishing Company, Ltd. 1991). 
19 Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 14-15.  “There was testimony, however, based upon observing 
motion in its limbs, that it did live for ten or fifteen minutes.”  Id. at 15.  It is interesting to note 
this sentence, since it validates the strong history of the born-alive doctrine and the impact of 
Holmes’ decision on fetal rights. 
20 Id. at 17.  Holmes reasoned: 
If it should be argued that an action could be maintained in the 
3
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Holmes considered the fetus to be part of the mother21 and did not regard the 
fetus as a person.22 Therefore, the child had no standing to sue.23  It would be 
more than sixty years after Holmes’ decision before the judiciary finally 
recognized a cause of action for prenatal injury.24  The viability theory was 
born.25 
 
2.  Viability Theory 
 
In order to defeat Holmes’ entity theory, it was necessary to recognize 
                                                                                                                         
case supposed, and that, on general principles, an injury transmitted from 
the actor to a person through his own organic substance, or through his 
mother, before he became a person, stands on the same footing as an 
injury transmitted to an existing person through other intervening 
substances outside him, the argument in this general form is not helped, 
but hindered . . .  For, apart from the question of remoteness, the argument 
would not be affected by the degree of maturity reached by the embryo at 
the moment of the organic lesion or wrongful act.   
Id. at 16.  
21 It is interesting to note that Holmes’ father was a well-respected physician and lecturer at 
Harvard Medical School.  See Sheldon M. Novick, Introduction to the Dover Edition of 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW at iv (1991). 
22 Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 14.   
If a woman, between four and five months advanced in 
pregnancy, by reason of falling upon a defective highway, is delivered of a 
child, who survives his premature birth only a few minutes, such child is 
not a “person,” within the meaning of the [law], . . . for the loss of whose 
life an action may be maintained against the town by his administrator.  
Id. 
23 Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884).  Holmes concluded:  
[T]he unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, any 
damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was 
recoverable by her, we think it clear that the statute sued upon does not 
embrace the plaintiff’s intestate within its meaning; and have not found it 
necessary to consider the question of remoteness or the effect of those 
cases which declare that the statute liability of towns for defects in 
highways is more narrowly restricted than the common law liability for 
negligence. 
Id. at 17. 
24 See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D. D. C. 1946).  Bette Gay Bonbrest was removed 
from her mother’s uterus through the professional malpractice of J. Kotz.  Id. at 139.  Justice 
McGuire addressed the slippery slope argument by stating “[t]hat a right of action in cases of 
this character would lead to others brought in bad faith and might present insuperable 
difficulties of proof—a premise with which I do not agree—is no argument.”  Id. at 142-43. 
25 So to speak. 
4
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the fetus as a separate being from the mother.26  The perception of the fetus 
as its own person was predicated upon the born-alive doctrine.27  Although the 
fetus was within the womb, it became viable when it was capable of living 
outside of the uterus.28  Scientific advancements have progressively reduced 
the point of viability such that some jurisdictions are willing to legislate the exact 
week a child is viable.29  The measure of viability is extremely important with 
regard to a cause of action for fetal injury, since a viable child is generally 
considered a person.30  Unless the fetus is legally recognized as a person, they 
                                                 
26 See Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp at 140-42.  The Bonbrest court attacked Holmes’ entity theory: 
As to a viable child being ‘part’ of its mother—this argument 
seems to me to be a contradiction in terms.  True, it is in the womb, 
but it is capable now of extra-uterine life—and while dependent for its 
continued development on sustenance derived from its peculiar 
relationship to its mother, it is not a ‘part’ of the mother in the sense 
of a constituent element—as that term is generally understood.  
Modern medicine is replete with cases of living children being taken 
from dead mothers. 
Id. at 140. 
27 See supra  note 16 and accompanying text.  See also Teresa Foley, Dobson v. Dobson:  Tort 
Liability for Expectant Mothers?   61 SASK. L. REV. 177 (1998).  This article offers a discussion 
on Canadian law, with respect to tort liability of mothers, through an analysis of the Dobson 
case.  Cynthia Dobson was negligently operating a motor vehicle and caused fetal injury to 
her son Ryan.  Id at 178.  The Dobson court needed to determine whether Ryan had the legal 
capacity to sue his own mother for his prenatal injuries.  Id.  Before holding that the 
legislature should decide, the Court reasoned that “‘[w]hen the unborn child becomes a living 
person and suffers damage as a result of prenatal injuries caused by the fault of the negligent 
motorist the cause of action is completed.’”  Id. at 179 (quoting [1972] 2 O.R. 686, 702 
(Ont.H.C.)). 
28 Bonbrest, 65 F.Supp. at 140.  The court recognized that fetal dependence on sustenance did 
not automatically mean that the fetus was part of the mother.  Id.  See also  Bailey, supra note 
6.  Bailey states “that the unborn viable fetus was a child under the provision of Ohio’s child 
abuse statute.”  Id. at 1025 (citing In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 938 (Ohio C. P. 1986)). 
29 See, e.g ., H.B. 1947, 82nd Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999) (amends code to change presumption of 
viability from the 25th week to 24th week of pregnancy). 
30 According to the Ohio 1999 Session Law Service, an adopted resolution that alters Ohio 
Revised Code section 2901.01(B)(1)(a) defines a person to “include all of the following: (i) An 
individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, and association; (ii) An 
unborn human who is viable.”  1999 Ohio Laws 15.  The enactment further defines: 
(i) “Unborn human” means an individual organism of the species 
homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.  (ii) “Viable” means the 
stage of development of a human fetus at which there is a realistic 
possibility of maintaining and nourishing of a life outside the womb 
with or without temporary artificial life-sustaining support. 
Id. 
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have no standing within the courts to bring suit.31 
 
3.  Biological Theory 
 
The biological theory mirrors the viability theory except that a child32 
may bring a cause of action for injuries sustained from the moment of 
fertilization.33  This theory applies primarily to third-party liability for fetal 
injury.34   
 
B.  Parental Immunity 
 
Parental immunity is a means by which a parent may avoid legal liability 
based solely on the existence of a relationship between parent and child.35  
Virtually all jurisdictions36 have abrogated parental immunity to varying 
degrees.37  In a surprising opinion,38 the Chenault court contended that 
                                                 
31 “‘Standing to sue’ means that party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable 
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1405 (6th ed. 1990).   
32 The child must be born alive.  See supra  note 16 and accompanying text. 
33 See Freeman, supra  note 15, at 564.  See also  Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960).  
Sean Smith was injured in an automobile accident while in his mother’s womb.  Id. at 498.  As 
a result of the injury, Sean was born with deformities in his legs and feet.  Id. 
The most important consideration, however, is that the viability distinction 
has no relevance to the injustice of denying recovery for harm which can 
be proved to have resulted from the wrongful act of another.  Whether 
viable or not at the time of the injury, the child sustains the same harm after 
birth, and therefore should be given the same opportunity for redress.   
Id. at 504. 
34See discussion infra Part II.C.   
35 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). 
36 Louisiana is the only state to retain parental immunity.  See Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 
So.2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (retaining parental immunity as proscribed by LA. REV. STAT . 
ANN. § 571 (West 1999)). 
37 Current status of parental immunity throughout the United States: 
ALABAMA, Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So.2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989) (creating an exception to 
parental immunity for sexual abuse). 
ALASKA, Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967) (creating an exception to 
parental immunity for negligent driving). 
ARIZONA, Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43 (Ariz. 1995) (abrogating parental 
immunity). 
ARKANSAS, Robinson v. Robinson, 914 S.W.2d 292 (Ark. 1996) (creating an exception 
to parental immunity for willful tort committed by parent). 
CALIFORNIA, Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (abrogating parental 
immunity). 
COLORADO, Terror Min. Co., Inc. v. Roter, 866 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1994) (creating an 
6
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exception to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent in the pursuit of 
business or employment activities). 
CONNECTICUT, Ascuitto v. Farricielli, 711 A.2d 708 (Conn. 1998) (creating exceptions 
to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent in the pursuit of business or 
employment activities and for sexual abuse). 
DELAWARE, Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976) (creating an exception to 
parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental 
automobile liability insurance coverage). 
D.C., Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987) (declining to adopt doctrine of 
parental immunity). 
FLORIDA, Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 732 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review 
granted Aug. 23, 1999 No. 95,054 (creating  exceptions to parental immunity for 
negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental liability insurance coverage 
and for sexual abuse). 
GEORGIA, Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)  (creating an exception 
to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental 
liability insurance coverage). 
HAWAII, Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw. 1969). 
IDAHO, Farmer’s Ins. Group v. Reed, 712 P.2d 550 (Idaho 1985) (creating an exception 
to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental 
automobile liability insurance coverage). 
ILLINOIS, Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1956) (creating exception for willful 
and wanton misconduct by the parent). 
INDIANA, Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 1993) (creating exception for intentional 
felonious act of parent). 
IOWA, Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1995) (creating an exception to 
parental immunity for sexual abuse). 
KANSAS, Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980) (creating an exception 
to parental immunity for negligence in operation of motor vehicle). 
KENTUCKY, Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970) (creating exceptions for 
reasonable expressions of parental authority and for  parental discretion over care of 
the child). 
LOUISIANA, Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So.2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (retaining 
parental immunity as proscribed by LA. REV. STAT . ANN.§ 571 (West 1999)). 
MAINE, Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979) (creating an exception to parental 
immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental insurance 
coverage). 
MARYLAND, Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 550 A.2d 947 (Md. 1988) (creating an 
exception to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent in the pursuit of 
partnership business or employment activities). 
MASSACHUSETTS, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975) (parental 
immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental automobile 
liability insurance coverage). 
MICHIGAN, Plumley v, Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972) (limiting  parental immunity 
to reasonable expressions of parental authority and for parental discretion over care of 
7
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the child). 
MINNESOTA, Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (abrogating parental 
immunity and creating the reasonable parent standard). 
MISSISSIPPI, Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So.2d 906 (Miss. 1992) (creating an exception 
to parental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle). 
MISSOURI, Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991) (abrogating parental 
immunity and creating the reasonable parent standard). 
MONTANA, Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983) (creating an 
exception to parental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle). 
NEBRASKA, Clasen v. Pruhs, 95 N.W. 640 (Neb. 1903) (creating an exception to 
parental immunity for inhuman and cruel treatment). 
NEVADA, Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974) (declining to adopt doctrine of 
parental immunity). 
NEW HAMPSHIRE , Briere v, Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966) (creating an exception to 
parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental 
insurance coverage). 
NEW JERSEY, France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970) (creating an 
exception to parental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle). 
NEW MEXICO, Guess v. Gulf Ins., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981) (abrogating parental 
immunity). 
NEW YORK, Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969) (creating an exception 
to parental immunity for nonwillful tort committed by parent). 
NORTH CAROLINA, Carver v. Carver, 314 S.E.2d 739 (N.C. 1984) (creating an exception 
to parental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle). 
NORTH DAKOTA, Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967) (abrogating parental 
immunity). 
OHIO, Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984) (abrogating parental immunity). 
OKLAHOMA, Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984) (creating an exception to 
parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental 
automobile liability insurance coverage). 
OREGON, Chaffin v. Chaffin, 397 P.2d 771 (Or. 1964) (creating exception for willful and 
wanton misconduct by the parent). 
PENNSYLVANIA, Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971) (abrogating parental 
immunity). 
RHODE ISLAND, Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982) (creating an exception to 
parental immunity for negligent operation of motor vehicle). 
SOUTH CAROLINA, Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980) (abrogating parental 
immunity). 
TENNESSEE, Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994) (limiting parental 
immunity to reasonable expressions of parental authority, to  parental discretion over 
care of the child, and to parental supervision). 
TEXAS, Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971) (limiting parental immunity 
to reasonable expressions of parental authority, to parental discretion over care of the 
child). 
UTAH, Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) (creating an exception to parental 
8
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parental immunity presupposes the existence of a duty, and therefore, an 
absence of duty precludes the need to consider parental immunity.   
 
C.  Third-Party Liability for Fetal Injury 
 
Third-party liability was first recognized in Bonbrest v. Kotz.39  The 
Bonbrest child40 was negligently removed from her mother’s womb through 
professional malpractice.41  The court allowed a right of action for a child, born 
alive, to sue the negligent third party, regardless of the gestational stage that 
the injury occurred.42   
 
                                                                                                                         
immunity for sexual abuse) 
VERMONT , Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191 (Vt. 1977) (declining to adopt doctrine of 
parental immunity). 
VIRGINIA, Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971) (creating an exception to 
parental immunity in automobile accident cases). 
WASHINGTON, Chhuth v. George, 719 P.2d 562 (Wash. 1986) (creating an exception to 
parental immunity for willful and wanton misconduct by the parent). 
WEST VIRGINIA, Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1991) (creating 
exceptions to parental immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of 
parental automobile liability insurance coverage and for willful misconduct by the 
parent). 
WISCONSIN, Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963) (limiting parental immunity to 
exercises of parental authority and parental discretion over care of the child). 
WYOMING, Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1992) (abrogating parental 
immunity in cases of ordinary negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle). 
38 Nearly one-third of Appellant’s Brief is dedicated to the inapplicability of parental 
immunity.  See Brief for Appellant at 23-31, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 
05-96-00279-CV).   
The Doctrine of Parental Immunity was not intended to 
protect the type of wil[l]ful, intentional, and foreseeable injury to 
result to a child at the hands of its parents, and then provide 
protection to the parent.  Even in the unlikely event that the court 
were to hold that Appellee’s actions fall within the intended scope of 
the Parental Immunity Doctrine, her actions are still not immune 
since they fall within a specific exception previously established and 
recognized by the Texas courts. 
Id. at 31.  (referring to Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Soignet, 1994 WL 720014, at *11 (Tex. 
App. 1994, judgment set aside) (holding that willful conduct is the “result of conscious 
indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of the person affected by it.”). 
39 65 F.Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946). 
40 Bette Gay Bonbrest.  Available in WL synopsis of Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 
1946). 
41 Id. at 139. 
42 Id. at 141. 
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D.  Criminal Punishment for Fetal Abuse 
 
The prosecution of pregnant women for substance abuse helps women 
to find treatment and protects the health of the fetus.43  All jurisdictions punish 
the use of controlled substances,44 and the delivery of controlled substances to 
an unborn child is punishable in some jurisdictions.45  One Michigan appellate 
court held that prenatal use of drugs is probative of future child neglect.46  In 
addition, there is a trend, for criminal purposes, to include unborn humans 
within the definition of a person.47  In re Ruiz48 was decided at the Ohio trial 
court level.  Ruiz held that a viable fetus qualifies as a child for the purposes of 
child abuse statutes.49  As discussed supra, parental immunity does not protect 
a parent from willful misconduct.50 
                                                 
43 See Tiffany M. Romney, Comment, Prosecuting Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies:  The 
State’s Interest in Protecting the Rights of a Fetus Versus the Mother’s Constitutional 
Rights to Due Process, Privacy and Equal Protection, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 325 (1991).  
“Advocates of prosecution propose that the creation of crimes that punish women who 
endanger their fetuses would educate the public through ‘the publicity of the trial, conviction, 
and sentencing.’”  Id. at 329 (quoting Thompson, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct 
During Pregnancy:  A Decision-Making Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L. J. 357, 367 (1989)). 
44 It is beyond the scope of this Note to detail the plethora of crimes and penalties available 
throughout the United States for the use of controlled substances. 
45 See e.g., Johnson v. State, 578 So.2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), decision quashed by 602 
So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (finding, for the first time, a woman guilty of gestational substance 
abuse).  See also  Christina von Cannon Burdette, Note, Fetal Protection – An Overview  
Recent of State Legislative Response to Crack Cocaine Abuse by Pregnant Women, 22 MEM. 
ST. U. L. REV. 119 (1991) (discussing the delivery of drugs to minors).  See also  Catherine A. 
Kyres, Note, A “Cracked” Image of my Mother/Myself?  The Need for a Legislative Directive 
Proscribing Maternal Drug Abuse, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1325 (1991) (discussing maternal 
drug abuse in relation to child welfare statutes).  “Absent an express statutory definition, 
courts have had to determine whether the terms ‘neglected,’ ‘abused,’ or ‘dependent’ 
encompass children born exposed to drugs in utero .”  Id. at 1332. 
46 Matter of Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).  “Since a child has a legal 
right to begin life with a sound mind and body, it is within this best interest to examine all 
prenatal conduct bearing on that right.”  Id.  See also  Mary J. Pizzo, Comment, Prenatal 
Substance Abuse:  A Call for Legislative Action in Maryland, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 329 (1993) 
(discussing the criminal liability of the mother for prenatal abuse). 
47A person includes “an unborn human who is viable.”  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2901.01 B(1)(a)(ii) (West 1999).   
48 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986).  See generally Deborah Ann Bailey, Comment, Maternal 
Substance Abuse:  Does Ohio Have an Answer?, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1019 (1992) 
(commenting on the problems facing Ohio courts when  dealing with maternal substance 
abuse). 
49 Ruiz,  500 N.E.2d at 939.  Luciano Ruiz was born positive for cocaine and heroin from a 
drug-addicted mother.  Id. at 936. 
50 See Alison M. Leonard, Note, Fetal Personhood, Legal Substance Abuse, and Maternal 
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E.  Public Policy 
 
According to the GAO,51 each drug-impaired child costs the United 
States economy approximately one million dollars.52  In order to abate the 
problem, there is a trend to protect fetal rights.53  These proposals pertain to 
                                                                                                                         
Prosecutions:  Child Protection or “Gestational Gestapo”, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 615 (1998) 
(exploring the issues surrounding prosecution of women for injuries sustained by their fetus 
as a result of their substance abuse).  See also  Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 
(S.C. Sup. Ct. July 15, 1996) opinion withdrawn and superceded on rehearing by Whitner v. 
State, 492 S.E. 2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (finding Whitner guilty of child neglect after giving birth to a 
cocaine-positive baby). 
51 General Accounting Office. 
52Victoris J. Swenson, et al., Pregnant Substance Abusers:  A Problem that Won’t Go Away, 
25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 623, 631 (1994). 
53 A sample of proposed legislation for some states in 1998 & 1999: 
ARKANSAS, H.R. 1014 requests a study to determine the age at which unborn babies 
begin to feel pain; H.R. 1014, 82nd Leg., (Ark. 1999) (enacted).  H.B. 1947 amends 
code to change presumption of viability from 25th week to 24th week of pregnancy 
H.B. 1947, 82nd Leg. (Ark. 1999).  H.B. 1613 creates prenatal and early childhood 
nurse home visitation program.  H.B. 1613, 82nd Leg. (Ark. 1999). 
CALIFORNIA, A.B. 1071 allocates 5% of funds from tobacco settlement for health 
care to uninsured children and prenatal care.  A.B. 1071, 1999-00 Leg. (Cal. 1999). 
COLORADO, H.B. 1018 provides prenatal care for undocumented aliens.  H.B. 1018, 
62nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1999) (enacted). 
CONNECTICUT, H.B. 5718 provides prosecution for crime of violence against unborn 
child.  H.B. 5718, 1999 Leg. (Conn. 1999). 
DELAWARE, S.B. 156 requires insurance coverage for prescription strength prenatal 
vitamins.  S.B. 156, 140th Leg. (Del 1999). 
HAWAII, H.B. 1346 creates offense of endangering the welfare of a fetus and imposes 
probation for 6-9 months for the mother.  H.B. 1346, 20th Leg. (Haw. 1999). 
ILLINOIS S.B. 739 allows for reckless homicide of an unborn child by the operation of 
snow-mobiles or water craft.  S.B. 739, 91st Leg. (Ill. 1999) (enacted). 
KANSAS, H.B. 2319 concerns humane treatment of the fetus.  H.B. 2319, 78th Leg. 
(Kan. 1999). 
KENTUCKY, H.B. 292 includes an unborn child in utero in the definition of human 
being. H.B. 292, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998).  H.B. 293 allows for prosecution of 
wrongful death of an unborn child without regard for gestational stage.  H.B. 293, 1998 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998). 
LOUISIANA, S.B. 225 relates to the civil rights of an unborn child.  S.B. 225, 1999 
Leg. (La. 1999). 
MAINE, H.P. 805 creates categories for crimes against unborn children.  H.P. 805, 
119th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1999). 
MASSACHUSETTS, H.B. 816 defines viability of a fetus, H.B. 816, 181st Leg., 1999 
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999); S.B. 270 establishes family outreach for children prenatal 
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social policy as well as all the areas of law discussed supra.54  States such as 
Ohio have established substance abuse assessment and treatment referral 
                                                                                                                         
through age five, S.B. 270, 181st Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999); H.B. 780 
provides public information for improvement of prenatal care, H.B. 780, 181st Leg., 1999 
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999); S.B. 456 provides pregnant women with information for 
improved prenatal care,  S.B. 456, 181st Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999). 
MONTANA, H.B. 600 adopts standards to protect children from prenatal exposure to 
pollutants.  H.B. 600, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999). 
NEBRASKA, L.B. 111 allows for prosecution of wrongful death of an unborn child 
without regard for gestational stage.  L.B. 111, 96th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 1999). 
NEW JERSEY, A.B. 2524 allows for prosecution of murder of a fetus.  A.B. 2524, 
208th Leg. (N.J. 1998). 
NEW MEXICO, H.B. 844 provides prenatal care to uninsured residents.  H.B. 844, 44th 
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1999). 
NEW YORK, A.B. 6654 allows for prosecution of assault of an unborn child without 
regard for gestational stage.  A.B. 6654, 222nd Leg. (N.Y. 1999). 
PENNSYLVANIA, S.B. 608 requires health practitioners to disclose prenatal diagnosis 
policy.  S.B. 608, 183rd Leg., 1999-00 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999). 
SOUTH CAROLINA, H.B. 3863 includes unborn child in the definition of a person for 
certain crimes.  H.B. 3863, 113th Leg. (S.C. 1999). 
TEXAS, H.B. 181 establishes the beginning of life to be the moment of fertilization; 
H.B. 181, 76th Leg. (Tx. 1999).  H.B. 682 relates to the death or injury of an unborn 
child; H.B. 682, 76th Leg. (Tx. 1999).  S.B. 1725 establishes a neonatal and prenatal 
care outreach project for Medicaid recipients.  S.B. 1725, 76th Leg. (Tx. 1999). 
VERMONT, H.B. 357 establishes crimes against human fetus.  H.B. 357, 65th Biennial 
Sess. (Vt. 1999). 
VIRGINIA, H.J.R. 196 allows funding for prenatal care, H.J.R. 196, 1998 Sess. (Va. 
1998); S.B. 198 allows for prosecution of murder of a fetus.  S.B. 198, 1999 Sess. 
(Va. 1999). 
WASHINGTON, S.B. 5390 provides prenatal care to increase healthy births.  S.B. 
5390, 56th 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999). 
54 See Rebekah R. Arch, Comment, The Maternal-Fetal Rights Dilemma:  Honoring a 
Woman’s Choice of Medical Care During Pregnancy, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 637 
(1996).  Arch discusses the reasons that women refuse recommended medical treatment, 
including religious convictions and fear.  Id. at 642.  “Physicians should regard any woman’s 
refusal to consent to the t reatment they recommend as a serious medical-legal dilemma and 
not as an occurrence which serves to merely prompt acquisition of a court order.”  Id. at 643.  
Arch concludes with:   
As technological advances in fetal diagnosis and therapy continue, 
health care providers and health care institutions should also 
continue to create positively focused alternative methods of 
optimizing the outcome and minimizing the risk to patients whose 
ethics or moral values will not allow them to participate in every 
treatment that is recommended by their physician. 
Id. at 673. 
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programs,55 while states such as Texas have proposed prenatal outreach 
programs.  While these programs enhance the chances that a child is born 
healthy, there is a long way to go before a uniform system is in place.56  
                                                 
55 Ohio Revised Code § 5111.017 provides:  
The department of human services shall establish a program 
for substance abuse assessment and treatment referral for recipients 
of medical assistance under this chapter who are pregnant and are 
required by statute or rule of the department to receive medical 
services through a managed care organization.  Each such pregnant 
woman shall be screened for alcohol and other drug use at her first 
prenatal medical examination. 
The department of human services shall require each 
managed care organization providing services to medical assistance 
recipients pursuant to a contract with the department of human 
services to inform persons who will provide prenatal medical servi ces 
to a pregnant recipient about the requirements of this section.  The 
department also shall require persons providing prenatal medical 
services to a pregnant recipient pursuant to the managed care 
organization’s contract with the department to do both of the 
following if the person providing prenatal medical services, following 
screening, determines the recipient may have a substance abuse 
problem:  (A)  Refer the recipient to an organization certified by the 
department of alcohol and drug addiction services for assessment; 
(B) Inform the recipient of the possible effects of alcohol and other 
drug use on the fetus. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5111.017 (West 1999). 
56 See Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn:  A Return 
to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745 (1990).  Robin-Vergeer opines about the state 
of legislation that is still accurate today, a decade later: 
Unless legislation clearly delineates when officials may 
consider drug-exposed infants neglected and explicitly mandates 
reporting in such cases, there is no assurance that the children who 
are in real need of intervention will be protected.  Because counties 
have been forced to grapple with increasing numbers of drug-exposed 
infants without comprehensive guidance from the state legislature, a 
child in need of protection may be ignored in one county, while a 
child with a fully functional family may be removed from his home in 
another.  Moreover, without statutory guidelines, hospitals are free to 
either under- or over-report instances of maternal drug use and 
neonatal drug exposure.  Screening and county intervention currently 
pivot on the luck of the draw.  Action depends upon which side of the 
county line one lives and upon which hospital door is opened.  Only a 
coherent and principled vision of when intervention on behalf of the 
drug-exposed infant is appropriate will result in like infants being 
treated alike. 
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III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A.  Statement of Facts 
 
Adeline Mary (Mattie) Huie was born on October 8, 1993 with cocaine 
and alcohol in her blood.57 Molly Ann Huie, Mattie’s mother, had used cocaine 
and other illegal narcotics throughout Mattie’s prenatal development.58  From 
her birth, Mattie experienced medical problems attributed to Huie’s drug use, 
including cerebral palsy and other developmental problems.59  Melissa 
Chenault, Huie’s sister, was appointed as Mattie’s managing conservator, and 
filed suit, as next friend,60 to compensate Mattie for Huie’s conduct. 61 
 
B.  Procedural History 
 
Chenault initiated this suit, as Mattie’s conservator, in the 191st Judicial 
District Court in Dallas County, Texas.62  She named Molly Ann Huie, the 
mother, and Michael Anthony Riley, the putative father,63 as parties to the 
                                                                                                                         
Id. at 755. 
57 Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ). 
58 Id.  See also  Brief for Appellant at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-
96-00279-CV) (citing R. at 222.). 
59 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475.  See also  Brief for Appellant at 3, Chenault v. Huie, 989 
S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV) (citing R. at 222.). 
60 “One acting for benefit of infant, or other person not sui juris (person unable to look after 
his or her own interests or manage his or her own lawsuit), without being regularly appointed 
guardian.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (6th ed. 1990). 
61 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475.  “Chenault sought damages for past and future medical care, 
special education, physical and occupational therapy, loss of earning capacity, disfigurement, 
physical impairments, and past and future pain and suffering.  She also sought punitive 
damages.”  Id.  See also  Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 
1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV) (citing R. at 227.).  “Even as she wields the shield of social 
conscience and the sword of moral indignation, Appellant unabashedly admits this case is 
about money, specifically Appellee’s trust fund.”  Brief for Appellee at 20-21, Chenault v. 
Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV).  “Molly’s trust money should be used 
for the damages to her child and should not be available to buy crack cocaine or to pay 
lawyers to file motions seeking judicial approval of maternal crack cocaine abuse.”  Brief for 
Appellant at 3, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV).  
62Brief for Appellant at 1, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV) 
(Hon. David K. Brooks presiding).  “Appellant brought this suit for the real party in interest, 
Adeline Mary (Mattie) Huie, a minor, for permanent injuries caused by Molly Ann Huie, 
Mattie’s mother[] . . .”  Id. at 2 (citing R. at 222.). 
63 “The alleged or reputed father of a child born out of wedlock.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1237 (6th ed. 1990). 
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suit.64  In response, Huie filed a motion for summary judgment65 with a 
supporting brief.66  After a hearing, the trial court granted the summary 
judgment without explanation.67  Chenault nonsuited68 the father and 
appealed.69 
 
                                                 
64 Brief for Appellant at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV). 
65 Id.  (citing R. at 39.).  Summary Judgment was filed on July 19, 1995.  Id.  Chenault filed her 
response on August 30, 1995.  Id.  (citing R. at 92.).   
66 Brief for Appellee at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV) 
(asserting that Texas does not recognize a cause of action against a mother for prenatal 
injury, and if Texas did recognize the cause of action, parental immunity would bar the claim).  
Id. at 2-3. 
67 Brief for Appellant at 6, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV).  
“Judge Brooks did not clearly specify the ground upon which he was granting summary 
judgment, therefore, Appellant must and will attack all theories advanced in the motion for 
summary judgment.”  Id. 
68 “A term broadly applied to a variety of terminations of an action which do not adjudicate 
issues on the merits.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1058 (6th ed. 1990).  See also  Brief for 
Appellant at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV). 
69 Chenault identifies three points of error:  1. “The trial court erred in granting Appellee’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment . . .”  Brief for Appellant at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 
(Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV).   2. “The trial court erred in granting Appellee’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the grounds that Texas has not recognized civil liability on the part of 
a mother for negligence causing prenatal injury to her child . . .”  Id.  3. “The trial court erred in 
granting Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Appellee’s actions 
were legally privileged under the Parental Immunity Doctrine . . .”  Id. at 3.   
Huie answers with two reply points:  1. “The trial court correctly granted 
Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment because there is no cause of action against 
a mother for prenatal injuries to her child.”  Brief for Appellee at 2, Chenault v. Huie, 
989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1999) (No. 05-96-00279-CV).  2. “The trial court correctly 
granted Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment because the doctrine of parental 
immunity would bar the cause of action which Appellant seeks to create.”  Id.   
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Chenault court spuriously refused to establish a legal duty70 that 
would parallel the prevailing views71 of a child’s right to sue for prenatal injury.  
A duty72 is the first element to a cause of action for negligence.73  The term is 
closely related to, and sometimes used in conjunction with, the standard of 
care.74  Foreseeability is inextricably associated with the standard of care.75  To 
deny the existence of a duty from mother to fetus, the Chenault76 court 
attacked three points of view with respect to foreseeability.77  
 
A.  Prior to Conception 
 
It is possible to find a party liable for prenatal injury years before the 
child was conceived.78  This concept is on the slipperiest of slopes.79  Every 
woman who could bear a child would be required to maintain a healthy 
                                                 
70 “In negligence cases [duty] may be defined as an obligation, to which law will give 
recognition and effect, to comport to a particular standard of conduct toward another, and the 
duty is invariably the same, one must conform to legal standard of reasonable conduct in light 
of apparent risk.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 505 (6th ed. 1990).  Standard of care is further 
defined as “that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person should exercise in same or 
similar circumstances.  If a person’s conduct falls below such standard, he may be liable in 
damages for injuries or damages resulting from his conduct.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1404-
5 (6th ed. 1990). 
71 See discussion supra  Part II and accompanying notes. 
72 “A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.”  W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984). 
73 “Negligence . . . is simply one kind of conduct.”  KEETON, supra  note 72, § 30, at 164. 
74 Once again, the wisdom of Prosser and Keeton: 
A failure on the person’s part to conform to the standard 
required:  a breach of the duty.  These two elements go to make up 
what the courts usually have called negligence; but the term quite 
frequently is applied to the second alone.  Thus it may be said that 
the defendant was negligent, but is not liable because he was under 
no duty to the plaintiff not to be. 
Id. 
75 “If one could not reasonably foresee any injury as the result of one’s act, or if one’s 
conduct was reasonable in the light of what one could anticipate, there would be no 
negligence, and no liability.”  KEETON, supra  note 72, § 43, at 280. 
76 Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ). 
77 See Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 477-8. 
78 See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977).  The court found Mennonite 
Hospital liable for transfusing incompatible blood to Renslow eight years prior to her 
pregnancy, since it was foreseeable that a woman might become pregnant.  Id. at 1253. 
79 Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ). 
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reproductive condition, since it is reasonable to assume that a woman may get 
pregnant.80  However, the facts of this case do not concern what could go 
wrong prior to conception.  It is the Chenault court that takes it upon itself to 
speculate.81 
 
B.  The Moment of Fertilization 
 
The Chenault court argues that a woman may be unaware she is 
pregnant,82 which would saddle her with the obligation to monitor her lifestyle 
just in case she is pregnant.83  Consequently, her right to privacy would be 
infringed.84  Ironically, this lack of awareness poses no barrier to third-party 
liability.85  The Chenault86 court described the “unique relationship”87 between a 
                                                 
80 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 477. 
81 See id.  “No duty currently imposed under Texas law has such far reaching ramifications on 
matters involving day to day personal decisions.”  Id. at 477. 
82 Id. at 477.   
A woman’s knowledge of her pregnancy may depend on 
varying factors such as her health, general physical condition, and 
emotional state.  In many cases a woman may not be aware she is 
pregnant until long after damage to the fetus has been done.  
Furthermore, a woman’s initial awareness of her pregnant condition 
may depend upon whether the pregnancy was intentional or 
unintentional.  We perceive no justifiable reason for treating women 
who intended to become pregnant differently from those who did not. 
Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that a woman’s right to privacy is 
weighed against the compelling state interests to protect the unborn child and identifying 
viability as the moment that the state’s interest becomes compelling).  See also  Krista L. 
Newkirk, Note, State-Compelled Fetal Surgery:  The Viability Test is Not Viable, 4 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 467 (1998).  Newkirk discusses the potentially conflicting view of fetal 
surgery.  Id. at 482.  Does the state have a compelling interest to insure the healthiest 
newborns possible at the expense of Roe?  Id.   
It may be argued that the state has an economic interest in 
trying to guarantee that the healthiest children possible are born 
within its borders.  This argument fails under the [biological theory] 
because it is in opposition to the argument opposing abortion.  It 
would be inconsistent for the state to argue for the birth of children 
that are not wanted by their mothers, therefore posing an economic 
hardship on the state, while arguing that the state’s economic 
interest in preventing the cost of malformed children warrants 
violating a woman’s fundamental right of privacy. 
Id.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965) (recognizing the 
fundamental right of privacy in marriage). 
85 See discussion supra  Part II.C. 
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mother and her unborn child beginning at the moment of conception for both 
Texas case law88 and Texas proposed statutes.89  The court’s reasoning is a 
contradiction in terms.  The court followed the biological theory90 to extol the 
virtues of the unique relationship, but the court would not recognize that a duty 
exists because of that relationship.91 
 
The court in Bonte v. Bonte92 concurs with the unique relationship 
between mother and fetus.93  However, this relationship does not preclude the 
mother from being held to the same standard of care as attributed to her for 
children already born.94  In a similar case,95 the Texas Supreme Court held that 
                                                                                                                         
86 Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ). 
87 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475.  See Gerard M. Bambrick, Note, Developing Maternal 
Liability Standards for Prenatal Injury, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 592 (1987) (discussing maternal 
liability with respect to the civil context).  Bambrick’s discussion is the precursor to the 
Chenault decision:  “Holding a mother to the same standard of conduct as a third person, 
while representing a mechanically correct convergence of current law regarding parental 
immunity and recovery for prenatal injury, fails to account for the uniqueness of the fetal-
maternal relationship.”  Id.  at 604.  Compare  Carolyn L. Andrews, Comment, Parent-Child 
Torts in Texas and the Reasonable Prudent Parent Standard , 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 113 (1988). 
88 See Yangdell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971) (holding that a child born alive 
may recover for damages without regard for the stage of gestation).  See also Sam S. Kepfield, 
Perinatal Substance Abuse:  The Rhetoric and Reality of “Rights,” and Beyond, 1 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S L.J. 49 (1993) (discussing maternal rights of privacy, autonomy, and integrity).  
“[Roe] balanced Texas’ assertion that life began at conception and [Roe’s] contention that 
the right to terminate a pregnancy should be unrestricted.”  Id. at 53.  
89 See generally H.B. 1382, 76th Leg. (Tex. 1999) (defining an individual to include “an unborn 
child at every stage of gestation in the uterus of the mother from fertilization until birth.”) 
90 See discussion supra  Part II.A.3. 
91 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478. 
92 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992) (holding that a child born alive may bring suit against his or her 
mother for prenatal injury caused by the mother’s negligence).  “While we recognize that the 
relationship between mother and fetus is unique, we are not persuaded that based upon this 
relationship, a mother’s duty to her fetus should not be legally recognized.”  Id. at 466. 
93 Id.  The Bonte court summarizes: 
We disagree that our decision today deprives a mother of her 
right to control her life during pregnancy; rather, she is required to act 
with the appropriate duty of care, as we have consistently held other 
persons are required to act, with respect to the fetus.  The mother 
will be held to the same standard of care as that required of her once 
the child is born.   
Id. 
94 The Bonte court reasoned:   
If a child has a cause of action against his or her mother for 
negligence that occurred after birth and that caused injury to the 
child, it is neither logical, nor in accord with our precedent, to 
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a child may sue his parents for unreasonable exercise of parental authority for 
injuries received in an automobile accident.96  The Chenault court still denied 
the duty.97  “The life of the law has not been logic . . .”98 
 
The following public policy concerns set out in Stallman v. Youngquist99 
and followed by the Chenault court attest to the court’s predicament. 
 
A legal right of a fetus to begin life with 
a sound mind and body assertable 
against a mother would make a 
pregnant woman the guarantor of the 
mind and body of her child at birth.  As 
legal duty to guarantee the mental and 
physical health of another has never 
before been recognized in law.  Any 
action which negatively impacted on 
fetal development would be a breach of 
the pregnant woman’s duty to her 
developing fetus.  Mother and child 
would be legal adversaries from the 
moment of conception until birth.100 
 
The court further states that a mother will not disclose substance abuse 
or neglect for fear of liability.101  This assertion is ridiculous, since this case will 
                                                                                                                         
disallow the child’s claim against the mother for negligent conduct 
that caused injury to the child months, days, or mere hours before 
the child’s birth.   
Id. 
95 See generally Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988) (reasoning that the action will not 
threaten parental authority or discretion (referring to parental immunity parameters set forth in 
Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971) (holding that a parent is immune from suit 
for the discharge of parental authority))). 
96 See Jilani, 767 S.W.2d at 673. 
97 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478. 
98 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (General Publishing Company, Ltd. 1991) 
(1881). 
99 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988) (finding no cause of action by a fetus, born alive, against its 
mother for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries from an automobile accident).  See also, 
Cullotta v. Cullotta, 678 N.E.2d 717 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that no cause of action may be 
brought against a mother for prenatal negligence). 
100 Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 359. 
101 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478.  “Fearing civil liability, some pregnant women may never 
reveal critical facts about their conduct to their physicians, resulting in less than adequate 
prenatal care.”  Id. 
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allow a mother to abuse her fetus and take no responsibility for her actions.102   
 
In the Matter of W.A.B., the Texas court of Appeals recognized that “[a] 
mother’s use of drugs during the pregnancy is conduct which endangers the 
physical and emotional well-being of the child.”103  W.A.B.104 recognized the 
breach of duty and subsequently terminated the mother’s parental rights.105  
Amazingly, the Chenault court did not give credence to this finding.106 
 
The first case to consider the reasonableness107 of parental discretion 
was Grodin v. Grodin.108  Grodin applied a balancing test that measured the 
reasonableness of the risk of harm in terms of the utility of a parent’s conduct 
in relation to the magnitude of the riskcreated.  In the event the conduct was 
unreasonable, parental immunity would be unavailable.109  If the conduct were 
reasonable, then immunity would be available.110 
 
Chenault offered an overbroad balancing test111 that successfully 
dodged112 the issue of establishing a standard of care,113 even though this 
court acknowledged “that Huie’s conduct would likely, if not unquestionably, be 
found unreasonable under any standard of care.”114  The court missed the 
irony of its own opinion.  The primary reason the court denied the duty is based 
on the broad implications in establishing a standard of care,115 yet the court 
had no trouble recognizing unreasonable behavior.116 
 
C.  Actual Knowledge 
 
In the event that a mother has actual knowledge117 of her pregnancy, 
                                                 
102 See discussion supra  Part II.B. 
103  In the Matter of W.A.B., 979 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App. 1998, no writ). 
104 Id. at 806. 
105 The court based their findings on the mother’s criminal history, imprisonment, and illegal 
drug use during and after pregnancy.  Id. at 807. 
106 See Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478. 
107 The court borrowed the term from Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169, 169 (Mich. 1972). 
108 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).  The child brought suit against his mother for 
damage to his teeth as a result of mother’s use of medication during pregnancy.  Id. at 869. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478.  The court weighs “the ‘social utility,’ the burden of guarding 
against injury, and the consequences of placing a legal burden on a pregnant woman.”  Id. 
112 “These matters are uniquely within the legislature, not the judiciary.”  Id. 
113 See id. 
114 Id. 
115 See id. 
116 See supra  note 87 
117 See Joseph S. Badger, Note, Stallman v. Youngquist “No You Can’t Sue Mommy in 
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logic dictates that she take care of her body in a reasonable manner in order to 
maximize the health of the child.118  However, “the life of the law has not been 
logic . . .”119  The reasonable parent standard has been adopted by several 
jurisdictions.120  This standard measures whether a mother has acted as a 
prudent pregnant woman would act given the circumstances of her pregnancy. 
 This is the point at which the Chenault court121 is unwilling to venture.122  The 
legislature has clearly established standards of behavior with respect to drug 
abuse and child abuse.123  The legislature has further established outreach 
programs to enable uninsured mothers an opportunity to access prenatal 
care.124  The lawmakers are setting a higher standard for childcare out of a 
concern for the next generation, but Chenault’s125 decision has gone against 
current logic,126 because Chenault rejected the reasonable parent standard.127 
                                                                                                                         
Illinois;” The Illinois Supreme Court Rejects Maternal Prenatal Civil Liability, 11 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 409 (1991) (detailing the Stallman decision).  “If . . . the standard imposed a duty of 
care on a woman only when she had actual knowledge of her pregnancy . . . a woman could 
act with impunity towards her fetus at precisely the same time where the fetus is most 
susceptible to injury.”  Id. at 435.  See also  Beal, supra  note 13.  “A standard which assumes a 
woman knows when she has conceived may result in the imposition of a duty on a woman to 
use care in the treatment of her body long before conception actually occurs.”  Id. at 364-5.  
See supra  note 79 for a reminder of this can of worms. 
118 See Pizzo, supra  note 46 at 342.  “Once a woman has decided to carry her pregnancy to 
term she assumes the duty to use reasonable care in ensuring the safety of the fetus.”  Id.  
See also Michelle D. Wilkins, Comment, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse:  
An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L. J. 1401 (1990) 
(discussing the insufficiency of prosecution for prenatal drug abuse).  "[E]ven if the woman 
knew the hazards of cocaine, she does not actively intend to harm her child as does one who 
beats or molests a child.  Addicts take cocaine because they are dependent on it, not because 
they want to hurt their fetuses.”  Id. at 1435.  Compare  Zimmerman v. Wisconsin, No. 96-CF-
525 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1996) rev’d 596 N.W. 2d 490 (Wisc. App. 1999) (finding Zimmerman guilty of 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree reckless homicide).  Zimmerman 
was quoted as saying, “I’m going to go home and keep drinking and drink myself to death, 
and I’m going to kill this thing because I don’t want it anyways.”  Don Terry, In Wisconsin, A 
Rarity of a Fetal-Harm Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1996, at A6. 
119 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (General Publishing Company, Ltd. 1991) 
(1881). 
120 See supra  note 37. 
121 Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ). 
122 See id.  “Inconsistent and unpredictable jury verdicts would render a ‘reasonable pregnant 
woman’ standard meaningless.”  Id.  
123 See supra  note 55. 
124 See id. 
125 Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999, no writ). 
126 See Deborah M. Santello, Note, Maternal Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 22 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 747 (1988) (discussing the standard of care with regard to maternal liability to an 
unborn child).  Santello sums up the flow of logic for determining an action for prenatal 
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When a child is injured en ventre sa mere128 and subsequently born 
alive, the child potentially has recourse against only two sources:  third 
parties129 and parents.  Virtually all jurisdictions, including Texas,130 recognize a 
cause of action for negligence against third-parties for injuries to the fetus.131  
With the exception of automobile accidents132 and sexual abuse,133 or both,134 
                                                                                                                         
injuries: 
Those states abolishing parent-child tort immunity and 
recognizing third party liability for fetal injuries from the point of 
conception would be most receptive to the child’s suit against its 
mother.  Those jurisdictions partially abrogating the immunity 
doctrine and allowing an infant’s action for prenatal injuries to stand 
may also be swayed by current social trends and permit a suit of 
maternal liability for prenatal injuries.  Undoubtedly, states least apt 
to allow a child’s cause of action against its mother for negligently 
inflicted prenatal injuries are those refusing both to abrogate the 
parent-child immunity doctrine and failing to recognize an action for 
prenatal injuries. 
Id. at 776 (citations omitted). 
127 See Andrews, supra  note 87 (summarizing a child’s right to sue for prenatal injuries in the 
state of Texas).  Andrews calls for the abolition of parent-child immunity “and free the 
otherwise uncompensated child tort-victims  to bring their causes of action to a proper forum 
where they can be heard and adjudicated fairly, on the basis of the reasonable prudent parent 
standard, without regard to privilege or the shield of immunity.”  Id. at 127. 
128 “In its mother’s womb.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (6th ed. 1990). 
129 Third-parties may include individuals as well as corporations.  See Ascuitto v. Farricielli, 
711 A.2d 708 (Conn. 1998) (creating exceptions to parental immunity for negligence committed 
by parent in the pursuit of business or employment activities, i.e. respondeat superior); see 
also  discussion supra  Part II(C) and accompanying notes.   
130 See Delgado v. Yandell, 468 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. 1971) (holding that “a cause of action 
does exist for prenatal injuries sustained at any prenatal stage provided the child is born alive 
and survives.”)  The case involved an automobile accident in which Isabel Delgado, six 
months pregnant, was a passenger.  Id. at 475.  As a result of the accident, Elizabeth Delgado 
was born with permanent and disabling injuries.  Id. 
131 While it is beyond the scope of this Note to detail the plethora of cases that fall into this 
category, the Bonbrest case signified the beginning of this recognition. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 
65 F.Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946); see also  discussion supra  Part II(C) and accompanying 
notes.   
132 See, e.g ., Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979) (allowing a suit for negligence 
committed by parent to the limits of parental insurance coverage); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 
1013 (R.I. 1982) (creating an exception to parental immunity for negligent operation of motor 
vehicle). 
133 See Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So.2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989) (creating an exception to parental 
immunity for sexual abuse). 
134 See Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (creating exceptions to parental 
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very few jurisdictions recognize a cause of action against the parent for 
prenatal injuries.135  Many jurisdictions stop short of attaching liability by 
applying the doctrine of parental immunity.136  A court must acknowledge the 
existence of a legal duty before it may apply the parental immunity doctrine.137  
Chenault hid behind its inability to mandate a standard of care from mother to 
fetus, stepped backwards, and denied the existence of a duty between mother 
and child.138  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Texas judiciary has limited parental immunity protection 139 and 
penalized third-parties for injuries to unborn children.140   The Texas legislature 
seeks to mandate prenatal care to the uninsured,141 penalizes individuals for 
child abuse,142 and  recognizes life to begin at the moment of fertilization.143   
The judiciary and the legislature created each of these laws, and each 
recognizes a certain standard of care for protection of the unborn.144  Yet all 
these standards were not enough to protect Mattie’s suffering.145  For the court 
to state that a decision in favor of Chenault may actually have a negative 
impact on fetal health is absurd.146  The judiciary must rethink its decision when 
the abuser has more protection than the abused. 
 
Edward Sylvester147 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
immunity for negligence committed by parent to the limits of parental liability insurance 
coverage and for sexual abuse). 
135 See supra  note 37. 
136 See discussion supra  Part II.B. 
137 See Andrews, supra  note 87 at 129.  Andrews postulates:  “[The] failure to recognize a 
parental duty . . . is untenable.  It is paradoxical to hold that other relationships create a duty . 
. . but that a parent does not have such a duty towards his own child.”  Id. at 124-5 (citations 
omitted).  
138 See Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478. 
139 See supra  note 37 and accompanying text. 
140 See supra  note 131 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra  note 37 and accompanying text. 
142 See id.  
143 See id. 
144 See discussion supra  Part II and Part IV.  
145 Mattie died, at the age of five, just days after the Texas Appellate Court’s decision of April 
15, 1999.  Telephone interview with Jennifer Austin, Legal Assistant to Attorney John R. 
Howie – Counsel for Appellant, (June 23, 1999). 
146 See Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478. 
147 I want to thank my wife Karen.  With her love and support, all things are possible.  
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